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Abstract 
This research addresses main question of the conditions of debt-constraint 
expropriation and debt-facilitate expropriation, and the difference between those 
conditions on type of group ownership (group or no group-affiliate). Agency 
theory predicts that debt is bonding and monitoring mechanism for managers’ 
perquisites action. Expropriation of minority shareholders by majority 
shareholders hurts good corporate governance practices. The expropriation also 
hurts debtholders value. The research argues that the use of debt will minimize the 
expropriation level and maintain certain control to managers and majority 
shareholders, on behalf of minority shareholders and debtholders. The problem of 
majority versus minority and debtholders spreads widely in Indonesia. This 
research conducts analytical and statistical methods to examine the roles of debt 
policy as mechanism of good corporate governance practices in Indonesia. This 
research argues that debt has difference effect on financial performance based on 
certain debt characteristic. Two characteristics of debt are debt-constraint 
expropriation (DCE) and debt-facilitate expropriation (DFE). Different types of 
ownership, which are group and no group-affiliate, are also examined to support 
the main issues of DCE and DFE. The result will be useful for economic policy 
makers; firms level policy makers, investors, academician, and researchers in the 
area of finance, social science, and humanities. The research tests the main 
question with four hypotheses that test using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression and Wald test for coefficient test. The result shows support for 
differences in effect on debt to performance for DCE (positive effect) and DFE 
(negative effect). On DCE, no group-affiliate firms have higher positive effect of 
debt on performance than group-affiliate firms are. However, on DFE due to risk 
reduction mechanism, group-affiliate firms have less negative effect of debt on 
performance than no group-affiliate firms are. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The role of debt in corporate governance depends on how governance is 
exercised, i.e., on the structure of corporate ownership and control. Default on 
corporate debt might not affect the professional manager's net worth, but would 
certainly devastate his reputation and career. This would not be a concern for the 
controlling shareholder of a corporate group, who employs himself or herself as 
top manager and can borrow through a group affiliate from a group bank. 
Consequently, debt could constraint the expropriation of dispersed shareholders 
by professional managers, as in the U.S., yet it could facilitate the expropriation of 
minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders of the corporate groups that 
dominate the business scene in Indonesia. 
This research is considering the ownership, control and debt of all listed 
corporations with credible accounting data of the firms listed in Indonesia. This 
research argues that capital market in Indonesia is ineffective and more vulnerable 
to expropriation as well as more levered. The condition is giving the controlling 
shareholder more expropriations of the resources without direct control from 
debtholders.  
Indonesian firms have a controlling block of shares held by major 
shareholder. The condition supports the argument that the key agency problem is 
between the controlling (majority) and minority shareholders. The controlling 
shareholder often exerts control through a pyramid structure. Controlling 
shareholders have control rights in firms in excess of their control right, and they 
also participate in management (La Porta, Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999). Wolfenzon 
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(1998) argues that pyramids should be also more common in countries with poor 
shareholders protection. Mahadwartha (2004) tested the entrenchment and 
alignment hypothesis for internal institutional ownership1 in Indonesia and found 
that alignment mechanism is higher for high internal institutional ownership firm.  
In their pioneering analysis of the agency problem between professional 
managers and dispersed shareholders, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that 
debt constrains managerial expropriation by imposing fixed obligations on 
corporate cash flow. Jensen (1986, and 1989) further examined this argument in 
the context of free cash flow, debt, and leveraged buyouts. Jensen argues that free 
cash flow, debt, and leverage buyout forced managers to disgorge their 
corporations’ free cash flow, replacing equity with debt.2 
Other constraint for debt to impose on managerial expropriation in the U.S. 
is the role of managers’ reputation in the labor market (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 
1983b). Although the manager is not personally liable for his corporation’s debts, 
default would trigger winding-up proceedings that would force him to search for 
re-employment, just when his reputation had been crippled. However, debt could 
play a different role in corporate governance if managers whose reputation and 
career are not tied specifically to the corporation liable for the leverage made the 
key decisions. 
                                                
1
 Internal institutional ownership is term introduced by Mahadwartha (2004) to describe the 
uniqueness of ownership in Indonesia. Internal institutional ownership is ownership held by 
regular business institution, and not by financial firms. 
2
 Easterbrook (1984) argues that debt forces managers to be accountable to the external capital 
market. Lang et al (1996) document that debt curtails investment by firms with poor prospects, and 
that leverage increases when growth opportunities are less (see also Kim and Sorenson (1986), 
Titman and Wessels (1988)). Maloney et al (1993) document that leverage improves managerial 
decision making on key issues like acquisitions. 
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In contrast to the US firms, Indonesian firms have a controlling block of 
shares held by major shareholder. The condition supports the argument that the 
key agency problem is between the controlling (majority) and minority 
shareholders. The controlling shareholder often exerts control through a pyramid 
structure. Controlling shareholders have control rights in firms in excess of their 
control right, and they also participate in management (La Porta, Silanes, and 
Shleifer, 1999).  
Wolfenzon (1998) argues that pyramids should be also more common in 
countries with poor shareholders protection. Mahadwartha (2004) argued that firm 
with high internal institution will better control for managers perquisites and 
hopefully protect debtholders interest. However, the main question focuses on the 
interest of majority shareholders and minority shareholders. Internal institutional 
ownership is usually representation of majority shareholders or founder 
shareholders. 
To illustrate the expropriation, this research shows as follows: If the 
controlling shareholder owns 100% of corporation X, that owns 60% of 
corporation Y, that owns 25% of corporation Z, then its ownership rights (O) in Z 
are O=100% x 60% x 25% =15%, yet, through its majority control (C) of X and Y, 
its control rights in Z are C=25%, usually enough for effective control. By 
directing Z to buy goods or assets from X at a premium, the controlling 
shareholder expropriates 100% - 15% of the premium from Z’s other shareholders.  
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 1999a, and 1999b; and La Porta, Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000 introduced the measurement of an affiliate's 
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vulnerability to such an expropriation by the ratio O/C. The O/C ratio is 
controlling shareholder’s ownership rights O (defined as its percentage claim on 
the affiliate’s cash flows) to its control rights C (calculated by identifying the 
weakest link in each control chain and linking it to the controlling shareholder, 
then summing the percentage control rights across these links). A low O/C ratio 
indicates that the controlling shareholder has the incentive and the ability to use 
unfairly-priced transactions to shift cash from the affiliation to affiliates higher up 
the pyramid, in which it has higher ownership rights. 
Within a corporate pyramid, increased indebtedness by an affiliate needs 
not constraint expropriation by the controlling shareholder because the leverage 
can be rolled over by group banks, recycled into external loans guaranteed by 
other affiliates, or reshuffled ahead of auditors to other affiliates by intra-group 
loans or transfer pricing. Even a default by the affiliate needs not damage the 
reputation of the manager/controlling shareholder if the affiliation is an obscure 
control webs passing through several layers of the pyramid.  
In any case, a manager can shrug off reputation of controlling shareholder 
who employs himself or herself within the pyramid, in contrast to the severe 
problems that default would cause a professional manager thrown onto the 
external manager market tainted by clear responsibility for the defaulting firm. 
Thus, the higher fixed obligations will not constraint the controlling shareholder 
more tightly. On the contrary, it could facilitate expropriation of the affiliate by 
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allowing the controlling shareholder to control more resource without diluting his 
control stake or assuming more liabilities directly.3 
Those expropriations can include not only minority shareholders, but also 
creditors left with uncollectible leverage and tax payers forced to bail out the 
financial system endangered thereby. This research seeks to distinguish the 
relationship of debt to firm performance based on the conditions of Debt-
Constraint Expropriation (DCE) and Debt-Facilitate Expropriation (DFE), and 
using the empirical relationships that estimates in each condition of group-affiliate 
and no group-affiliate firms. Testing the argument requires an assumption that 
debt on DCE and DFE has different purposes based on firm’s interest of using 
debt. This determines whether debt decisions are dominated by the concerns of 
informed external suppliers of capital or by the interests of the controlling 
shareholder.  
This research argues that governance mechanisms can reduce default risk 
by mitigating agency costs and monitoring managerial performance and by 
reducing information asymmetry between the firm and the lenders. Corporate 
governance plays a significant role on shareholders, and debtholders protection. 
Debt as monitoring mechanism on agency conflict (Ismiyanti and Hanafi, 2004) is 
debtholders representation of interest on firm financial performance. Meanwhile, 
corporate governance is also concerned with the conflict of majority and minority 
                                                
3
 In a U.S. context, Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) argue that controlling shareholders 
may use leverage to inflate the voting power of their shares, and reduce the discipline of the 
market for corporate control. Stulz (1988) shows that managers who value control very highly rely 
primarily on debt financing in order to minimize dilution of their eqity stkes in the firm, thus 
making the firm less vulnerable to hostile takeover. 
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shareholders, and debt as governance mechanism will reduce the conflict 
especially on the conditions of debt as constraint expropriation. 
Indonesia confirms that capital market institutions are ineffective so that 
controlling shareholders (i) dominate decisions on debt, at least amongst group-
affiliate firm, and (ii) exploit this to increase the debt of firm more vulnerable to 
expropriation, presumably to acquire more resources to expropriate. Who lends to 
Indonesia corporations that are more vulnerable to expropriation? Loans could be 
from “related parties” sharing a controlling shareholder with the borrower. The 
facts brought the idea to also test the condition of group and no group-affiliate. 
1.1. Research Problems and Objectives 
 As described on the introduction section, this research has several 
problems to address. The problems include testing debt effect on firm financial 
performance, and the effect based on debt-constraint and debt-facilitate 
expropriation, and the issues regarding group and no group-affiliate. Details of 
research problems are: 
a. Is the effect of debt on firm financial performance positive when debt-
constraint expropriation (DCE)? 
b. Is the effect of debt on firm financial performance negative when debt-
facilitate expropriation (DFE)? 
c. Is the effect of debt on firm financial performance different between group-
affiliate and no group-affiliate, if DCE exist? 
d. Is the effect of debt on firm financial performance different between group-
affiliate and no group-affiliate, if DFE exist? 
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1.2. Research Originals 
The arguments and issues in this study are different from previous studies 
in some points of view. First, previous studies discussing debt as governance 
mechanism in Indonesian are lack of support on the role of debt as governance 
mechanism. Ismiyanti and Hanafi (2004); Mahadwartha (2002); and Mahadwartha 
(2004) focused on the interdependence relationship between financial policies 
such as debt, dividend, and investment.  
This research focuses on several specific conditions that matters on the 
issues of debt as governance mechanism such as expropriation. Second, while 
there is a great deal of empirical research on corporate governance, very little of it 
concerns the behavior of debt as constraint or facilitate expropriation, or the 
condition that supports such an expropriation. This study attempts to investigate 
these behaviors in empirical study on Indonesian listed firms. 
1.3. Research Contributions 
Transparency international published their corruption perception index on 
2005, and Indonesia’s score is 2.2 (scale of 10). The level of corruptions in 
Indonesia is very high and in the end will degenerate economic growth. Only 
Malaysia with score 5.1, and Singapore with 9.4 have better score than other 
Asian countries. Meanwhile Thailand with 3.8, and Philippines with 2.5 also 
shows mediocre and high corruption level.  
This research will help government, investors and regulators to examine in 
scientific approach the corporate governance implementation as tools to control 
firm’s level corruptions that could hurt shareholders and investors personal wealth. 
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Good corporate governance will support the mechanism to control corruptions on 
the firm level. Indonesia will be prospective and valuable as an investment 
destination (investment in capital market and foreign direct investment). 
Good corporate governance mechanism is essential to help ensure 
transparency in the conduct of private business. By instigating effective controls 
and greater transparency in their actions, companies can help address the supply 
side of corruption, in which money, gifts or other forms of inducement are 
provided or promised to achieve certain advantages. The results of this research 
will contribute to improve the understanding about corporate governance practices 
on debt policy, the behavior of debt on constraint or facilitate of expropriation and 
the effect of affiliated ownership issues on debt policy. The empirical results 
would also provide general indicators of corporate governance, which are useful 
for both regulator and business people in making debt policy decision as well as in 
providing certain role of debt on group and no group-affiliate. 
Investors will find this research very useful to arrange an investment 
strategy. The result also helps investors to choose between firms with the best 
good corporate governance practices especially related to debt as constraint of 
expropriation. Good corporate governance will enhance the quality of investors’ 
investment value; their quality of life and investment activity. Good governance 
mechanism such as debt-constraint mechanism also refers to better investors’ 
protections, and the effect of better protections will support the mechanism to 
minimize corruptions in Indonesia. 
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The rest of this research study is organized as follows. Part 2 outlines 
literature study of the role of debt on corporate governance mechanism. This 
section also presents conceptual framework and develops hypotheses. Part 3 
describes research method that consists of sample classification and data 
requirement, measurement variables and analysis technique. Part 4 contains result 
and discussion. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In this section, the research lays out the theoretical arguments motivating 
the empirical analysis on the effect of debt on financial performance. The 
argument will be followed by conceptual framework and hypotheses to be tested.  
2.1. The Role of Debt in the Governance Mechanism 
Debt policy became a substantial issue on corporate finance since 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued on debt irrelevance to firm value. Their rigid 
assumption brought many research after them that lessen those assumption. 
Several theory on corporate finance (Agency Theory, Pecking Order Theory, 
Signaling Theory, etc.) embrace their argument when lessen several Modigliani 
and Miller assumption. Modigliani and Miller (1963) complete their argument 
that tax saving mechanism will increase firm value as debt increase. This research 
based its argument on Modigliani and Miller (1963) and combined with Agency 
Theory and recent phenomena on corporate governance practices. 
Agency Theory argued that debt would bond expropriation on firm value, 
and lessen agency conflict between managers and shareholders. As Jensen and 
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Meckling (1976) suggest that agency cost is a trade off model, meaning that if 
certain agency cost is lower (i.e. agency cost of equity), then other agency cost 
will rise (i.e. agency cost of debt). As firms more depended on debt as sources of 
funds, they become more constraint by debt agreement. The agreement was made 
to constraint managers and shareholders action to expropriate firm wealth for their 
own interest. Bondholders or debtholders more highly concern on firm ability to 
repay their obligation. This research calls the situation as debt-constraint 
expropriation (DCE).  
Other contradicting situations also emerge from debt policy. Debt policy 
brought debtholders to concern on their investment. On the contrary, managers 
and shareholders also concern on how to shift their business risk to debtholders. 
As the result of such thought, managers and shareholders could expropriate cash 
from debt for their own interest and left debtholders bear all the cost. Firm with 
enough cash flow as internal sources of fund will use debt instead to support their 
investment opportunity. Debtholders who are willing to support such a behavior 
argue that they support a prospective firm with reliable investment opportunity, 
and internal sources. Those debtholders bear the cost if managers and 
shareholders exploit debtholders spirit, and use their internal cash flow for their 
own interest. This research suggests that the condition calls debt-facilitate 
expropriation (DFE).  
2.2. Group-affiliate and No Group-Affiliate Phenomena 
 Ownership structure of firm also will be divided as group and no group-
affiliate firm. Group-affiliate firm is a firm with internal institutional ownership 
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that belongs to the same holding firm (group). No group-affiliate is a stand alone 
firm with no relation to other firm or holding company. Mahadwartha (2004) 
introduced the term “internal institutional ownership” to differentiate ownership 
of institution such as insurance company, mutual fund managers, and other 
financial services firms, with business institution in non-financial sectors. 
Indonesian listed firm is known as family firm, because majority of firm belongs 
to founder’s shareholders who have more than 50% ownership. Their ownership is 
usually on behalf of business institution instead of personal. The facts support the 
argument that Indonesian firms (and other developing countries) consist of 
pyramid structure ownership (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999).  
Pyramid structure is usually consisting of several web-connecting firms 
that end up on behalf of personal ownership calls “ultimate shareholders”. This 
research is not focusing on ultimate shareholders phenomena but on web-
connecting firm or group and no group-affiliate.  
2.3. Debt-Constraint Expropriation and Debt-Facilitate Expropriation 
 This research argues that the effect of debt on financial performance 
moderated by debt characteristic on the expropriation of free cash flow. Firm with 
Debt-Constraint Expropriation (DCE) will have positive magnitude of debt to 
financial performance, meanwhile firm with Debt-Facilitates Expropriation (DFE) 
has a negative magnitude. This research based the argument on the assumption 
that debt-constraint policy has better expropriation control mechanism than debt-
facilitate expropriation. This research also argues that corporate governance 
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embrace debt as value relevance for shareholders and debtholders as well. The 
hypotheses for DCE (HC) and DFE (HF) are: 
HC: The effect of debt on financial performance in case of debt-constraint 
expropriation is positive. 
 
HF: The effect of debt on financial performance in case of debt-facilitate 
expropriation is negative. 
 
This research only uses sample with high free cash flow (FCF) to ensure 
that the sample can be compared between high FCF with high and low debt level. 
Categorization of DCE and DFE is based on FCF and debt level. Details of 
measurement are described on methods and analysis section. 
The research framework for DCE and DFE conditions is as follows: 
 
Figure 1. Research Framework for DCE and DFE Conditions 
2.4. Group-affiliate and No group-affiliate Hypotheses 
 As mentioned above, HC hypothesis will test on two different ownership 
conditions, which are group-affiliate and no group-affiliate. This research argues 
that DCE’s firm with group-affiliate will have less positive effect of debts on 
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financial performance than no group-affiliate firm. The argument is based on 
assumption that group-affiliate firm will have higher chance to be expropriated by 
other firm in the same group, although they have debt to constraint such an 
expropriation. Meanwhile, no group-affiliate firms are relatively free from 
expropriation and have debt to constraint such an expropriation. The hypothesis 
for DCE  (HCG) on group and no group-affiliate is: 
HCG: On DCE condition, the effect of debt on financial performance of group-
affiliate firm is positive and lower than no group-affiliate firm. 
 
The research framework for DCE on Group and No group-affiliate is: 
 
Figure 2. Research Framework for DCE on Group and No group-affiliate  
 
This research argues that DFE will have negative sign on the effect of debt 
on financial performance. The magnitude of negative effect is higher for group-
affiliate than no group-affiliate. The worst condition on DFE becomes severe if 
the firm is in group-affiliate category, because more chance their resources will 
expropriate by other parties such as shareholders and managers. Corporate 
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governance mechanism fails to control such an expropriation because the 
conditions created to support expropriation on firm resources. The hypothesis of 
DFE (HFG) on group and no group-affiliate is: 
HFG: On DFE condition, the effect of debt on financial performance of group-
affiliate firm is negative and higher than no group-affiliate firm4. 
 
The research framework for DFE on Group and No group-affiliate is: 
 
Figure 3. Research Framework for DFE on Group and No group-affiliate 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1. Data and Sample 
Samples are non-financial Indonesian listed firms with period of analysis 
from 1995 until 2004. This research will explore several statistical test such as 
linear regression and Wald test. All statistical tests are based on classical statistic 
assumptions pre-requirement. 
                                                
4
 The word “higher” means the negative effect of debt to financial performance, i.e. the effect of -5 
is higher than -1. 
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This research eliminates corporations reporting data that are not credible 
(i.e., negative debt or negative sales) and corporations with missing data on short 
term debt, long term debt, book or market value of equity, total sales, sales, 
earning, or income taxes. The ownership structure data on theses corporations are 
taken from Indonesian Capital Market Directory and the network of indirect 
ownership via other corporations is traced back in order to identify group and no 
group-affiliate of each firm.  
Consolidation forces the assets and liabilities of each subsidiary to be 
recognized in the accounts of the parent corporation. This can significantly affect 
the measurement. Rajan and Zingales (1995) noted that, in the year a corporation 
consolidates its accounts, its debt-to-capital ratio increases, on average, by 5% 
over the previous year. This suggests that if the sample included a parent 
corporation with unconsolidated accounts, then this research would typically be 
under-recording its leverage compared to a similar corporation with consolidated 
accounts. 
This could bias our results, but not in a direction that is easy to predict. To 
ensure consistency in the reporting of debt, this research eliminates all 
corporations reporting unconsolidated accounts, as well as corporations that 
provided no information about whether or not their accounts are consolidated. 
This elimination biases our empirical results against the conclusion on debt-
facilitate expropriation. This is because some eliminated corporations could have 
been using debt booked to subsidiaries to expropriate, while avoiding account 
consolidation legitimately or illegitimately. 
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This research does not take into account debt between listed corporations 
and unlisted subsidiaries that it controls in the accounting sense, which is 
eliminated by consolidation; such a debt is not relevant to agency issues since it is 
hardly likely to constraint the management of the parent corporation, or to 
facilitate expropriation in view of its transparency in the consolidated accounts. 
This research also excludes the unlisted subsidiaries of corporations reporting 
consolidated accounts, these subsidiaries usually have a few block shareholders 
and thus are not exposed to the agency problems that are our focus. Non-financial 
companies do not consolidate account with financial firms, so our debt measures 
include loans from group bank and financial companies. 
3.2. Variables Description 
3.2.1. DCE and DFE Criteria for Sub-Sample 
This research uses sample with high FCF only. This research divides 
between high FCF and low FCF using median value of FCF. Then, sample of high 
FCF will divide between Debt-Constraint Expropriation (DCE), and Debt-
Facilitates Expropriation (DFE). This research also uses median value to divide 
between high and low debt level. Following Table shows categorization for DCE 
and DCE. 
Table 1. DCE and DFE Criteria 
Samples are divided into two categories based on DCE and DFE criteria. DCE = Debt-Constraint 
Expropriation, and DFE = Debt-Facilitates Expropriation. The category is mutually exclusive. The 
criteria align with 1995 to 2004 period of research analysis. Free Cash Flow (FCF) proxies from 
Hackel, Livnat, and Rai (1996). Debt is adjusted with Total Assets (TA). 
FCF Debt/TA Category 
High FCF High Debt DFE 
High FCF Low Debt DCE 
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3.2.2. Group-Affiliate and No Group-Affiliate 
A corporation is a “group-affiliate” if it meets one of the four criteria 
described below. The criteria are: 
a. It is controlled by shareholder(s) via pyramiding, i.e., indirectly through 
another corporation in the sample;  
b. It is controlling another corporation in the sample;  
c. It has the same controlling shareholder as at least one other corporation in 
the sample;  
d. It has controlling shareholder, which is corporation or financial institution 
that is “widely-held” or no shareholder holds 10% or more of the control 
rights.5  
Group affiliate variable uses dummy variable of G = 1 for the corporation 
in group-affiliate; and G = 0 for no-group affiliate firm. Dummy variable (G) will 
use to establish interaction variable of debt policy. Interaction variable debt and 
dummy group (DG) is used to test HCG and HFG. 
3.2.3. Free Cash Flow 
This study used Hackel, Livnat, and Rai (1996) measurement of FCF with 
discretionary methods divided by total assets. 
FCF = TFCF + DOCO + DCEX 
Total Assets 
TFCF = (OCR – OCO) – CEX 
OCR = operating cash inflows 
OCO = operating cash outflows 
CEX = capital expenditures 
                                                
5
 Such corporations have the same incentive and opportunity to manipulate the corporations that 
they control as the controlling shareholder of a corporate pyramid. The same definition was used 
in Claessens et al. (1999b). Khanna and Palepu (2000) use a different definition. 
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DOCO = (OCO growth – sales growth)*(0,2 * OCO) 
DCEX = (CEX growth – cost of goods sold growth)*CEX 
OCO growth = (OCOt – OCOt-1)/OCOt-1 
Sales growth = (Salest – Salest-1)/ Salest-1 
CEX growth = (CEXt – CEXt-1)/CEXt-1 
Cost of goods sold growth (COGS) = (COGS t – COGS t-1)/COGS t-1 
 
3.2.4. Debt 
This research defines debt as the sum of long-term and short-term financial 
debt divided by total asset. This excludes non-financial liabilities, such as 
accounts payable, provisions for pensions, deferred taxes, and other provisions for 
future liabilities.  
AssetsTotal
DebtLongtermDebtShorttermDebt +=  
This research adjusts each debt ratios for industry and country effects by 
subtracting the median of the ratio for sample firm in the same industry. This 
leads to the corporation’s industry-adjusted ratios. This adjustment eliminates 
biases from the industry-specificity of accounting ratios, and inter-firm 
differences in the way in which accounting items are treated6 (La Porta et al., 
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000) the effectiveness of the bankruptcy system (Harris and 
Raviv, 1992; Franks and Torous, 1993); and the tax system (Miller, 1977; King 
and Fullerton, 1984; Graham, 1996). Thus, this research controls for factors 
affecting the debt of a specific industry to test whether debt is generally affected 
by a corporation’s vulnerability to expropriation. 
 
                                                
6
 See Rajan and Zingales (1995) for a discussion of these practices, and an analysis of differences 
in leverage across the G-7 countries. 
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3.2.5. Financial Performance 
 This research uses return on equity as financial performance proxy. Return 
on equity is performance indicator that is more on the shareholders side. 
Shareholders concern on their investment on the firm, which is represented by the 
return on equity. The equation for return on equity is: 
Equity
EATROE =  
Where; EAT = earnings after tax; Equity = book value of equity 
 
3.3. Control Variables 
This research uses three control variables (Internal Institutional Ownership, 
Firm’s Size, and Collateral Asset). The variables are as follows: 
a. Internal institutional ownership: Firm with high internal institutional 
ownership has higher performance than low internal institutional ownership 
(Mahadwartha, 2004). 
b. Firm Size: This is measured by the logarithm of the corporation’s total assets, 
Ln(TA). Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that size could proxy for the 
probability of default, which is higher for smaller firms. On the other hand, 
larger, more visible firms suffer less from informational asymmetry, have 
easier access to equity markets and, therefore, should be less levered, and 
higher financial performance. Mixed evidence is provided by Hoshi, 
Scharfstein and Kashyap (1990), Kester (1986), Kim and Sorensen (1986), 
and Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
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c. Collateral Asset: Asset tangibility is measured by the ratio of fixed to total 
assets. Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that fixed assets are easier to 
collateralize, and so reduce the agency costs of debt. The reduction of agency 
cost of debt will increase firm financial performance. However, Berger and 
Udell (1994) argue that this relationship would be weaker in relationship-
oriented economies.  
3.4. Empirical Models 
This research uses one independence variable (Debt; D), one dependence 
variable (financial performance; FP), three control variables (Internal Institutional 
Ownership – IIO; Firm’s Size – FS; and Collateral Asset – CA), and 
categorization between DCE and DFE; and group and no group-affiliate (G). The 
main equation for DCE and DFE sub-samples are as follows: 
FPiDCE = α + β11DiDCE + β12IIOiDCE + β13FSiDCE + β14CAiDCE + εiDCE (1) 
 
FPiDFE = α + β21DiDFE + β22IIOiDFE + β23FSiDFE + β24CAiDFE + εiDFE (2) 
 
The equation for test DCE and DFE for group and no group-affiliate is: 
FPiDCE = α + β31DiDCE + β32IIOiDCE + β33FSiDCE + β34CAiDCE + β35GiDCE + 
β36DiGiDCE + εiDCE 
(3) 
 
FPiDFE = α + β41DiDFE + β42IIOiDFE + β43FSiDFE + β44CAiDFE + β45GiDFE + 
β46DiGiDFE + εiDFE 
(4) 
 
 The research uses ordinary least square regression (OLS) with preliminary 
testing on classic regression assumption. Wald test will uses as coefficient test 
between group and no group-affiliate on DCE and DFE sub-sample. The 
hypotheses tests are shows in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Hypotheses Testing 
HC: The effect of debt to financial performance when debt-
constraint expropriation is positive. 
0 < β11 
HF: The effect of debt to financial performance when debt-
facilitate expropriation is negative. 
β21 < 0 
HCG: On DCE condition, the effect of debt to financial 
performance on group-affiliate firm is positive and lower 
than no group-affiliate firm. 
0 < β31 
0 < β31+ β36 
β31+ β36 < β31 
HFG: On DFE condition, the effect of debt to financial 
performance on group-affiliate firm is negative and 
higher than no group-affiliate firm. 
β41 < 0 
β41+β46 < 0 
β41+β46 < β41 
 
4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
The results are organised as follows. First, the results show descriptive 
statistics for independent variable (Debt; D), dependent variable (financial 
performance; FP), control variables (Internal Institutional Ownership – IIO; 
Firm’s Size – FS; and Collateral Asset – CA), and categorization between DCE 
and DFE; and group and no group-affiliate (G). Second, this research shows 
regression results for each of the category. Third section is discussion and 
suggestion. 
4.1. Descriptive Statistic 
This research uses pooling data with 1,559 firm-year observations and 158 
firms from 1995 until 2002, 148 firms for 2003, and 147 firms for 2004. The 
period of analysis is 1994 to 2004; however, this research uses growth model of 
free cash flows, and year 1994 is use to calculate the growth of 19957. Table 3 
shows sample between high and low free cash flow, then split of high free cash 
flow sample into high and low debt to determine two categories of Debt-Constrain 
Expropriation (DCE) and Debt-Facilitate Expropriation (DFE). Table 3 also 
                                                
7
 This method subtracts firm-year observations from 1,717 to 1,559.   
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showed group and non-group affiliated firms among high free cash flow firms. 
The result suggest that majority of listed firms are group affiliated, therefore 
vulnerable to expropriation from affiliate firms or owners. 
Table 3. High Free Cash Flow, DCE and DFE, Group and Non-group 
Sample divided into Low free cash flow, and high free cash flow. High free cash flow 
also divided into DCE and DFE, and group affiliated and non-group affiliated firms. 
Variable Firm Year % 
Low Free Cash Flow  779 49.97% 
High Free Cash Flow: 780 50.03% 
Debt-Constrain Expropriation (DCE) 390 50% 
Debt-Facilitate Expropriation (DFE) 390 50% 
Group and Non-group affiliated:    
Group affiliated (G=1) 735 94.23% 
Non-group affiliated (G=0) 45 5.77% 
 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of Debt-Constraint Expropriation 
(DCE) and Debt-Facilitate Expropriation (DFE). The table shows that each 
category has 390 observations. Financial performance variable (ROE) shows the 
highest negative minimum value for DCE category. Collateral assets for DFE also 
show the highest value of standard deviation. 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistic 
Descriptive statistic divides into two categories that are Debt-Constraint Expropriation (DCE) and 
Debt-Facilitate Expropriation (DFE). Debt (D), Firm performance (FP), Internal Institutional 
Ownership (IIO), Firm’s Size (FS), and Collateral Asset (CA). 
Debt Constrain Expropriation (DCE) FP D IIO FS CA 
 Mean 0.040 0.041 0.525 26.298 1.950 
 Median 0.085 0.046 0.592 26.496 0.724 
 Maximum 2.971 0.075 0.592 28.076 9.445 
 Minimum 
-3.166 0.003 0.000 24.060 0.001 
 Standard Deviation 0.596 0.020 0.143 0.855 2.300 
 Observations 390 390 390 390 390 
Debt-Facilitate Expropriation (DFE) FP D IIO FS CA 
 Mean 0.142 0.839 0.638 27.565 3.105 
 Median 0.186 0.403 0.673 27.598 0.263 
 Maximum 0.187 28.472 0.973 31.444 218.199 
 Minimum 0.001 0.185 0.000 24.232 0.000 
 Standard Deviation 0.061 2.084 0.204 1.481 14.781 
 Observations 390 390 390 390 390 
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4.2. Regression Result and Wald Test 
Table 5 shows regression result for first equation of Debt Constrain 
Expropriation (DCE). The result shows that only IIO insignificant and other 
variables significant ranging from alpha 1% to 10%. Coefficient of debt is positive 
4.035, which indicates that Hypothesis HC hold. Higher debt will increase firm 
performance.  
Table 5. Regression Result for HC 
Equation 1 contains of one main independent 
variable which is Debt and three control variables. 
The dependent variable is financial performance 
(FP). 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant -2.639 -2.780 *** 
β11 DEBT 4.035 2.191 ** 
β12 IIO 0.016 0.098  
β13 FS 0.094 2.645 *** 
β14 CA 0.022 1.931 * 
 R-squared 0.037 
 
 
 Table 6 shows regression result for second equation of Debt-Facilitate 
Expropriation (DFE). The result shows that FS and CA insignificant and other 
variables significant ranging from alpha 1% to 10%. Coefficient of debt is positive 
0.002, and significant 1%, which indicates that Hypothesis HF rejected. Higher 
debt will increase firm performance.  
Table 6. Regression Result for HF 
Equation 2 contains of one main independent 
variable which is Debt and three control variables. 
The dependent variable is financial performance 
(FP). 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 0.171 2.881 *** 
β21 DEBT 0.002 1.856 * 
β22 IIO -0.022 -1.679 * 
β23 FS -0.001 -0.272  
β24 CA 0.000 0.687   
 R-squared 0.012 
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The research argument of debt-facilitate expropriation when debt level 
high is not hold. However, the magnitude of debt coefficient of DCE is higher 
than DFE category. This result suggests that DCE have more positive effect to 
constraint expropriation rather than DFE category. 
Table 7 shows the regression for equation 3, the group and no-group 
related and the interaction with debt. The result shows that HCG significantly holds 
that partially confirm debt have positive effect on performance when debt-
constraint expropriation happened. Two more test conducted to test the robustness 
of the hypothesis. Wald test chooses as coefficient test for HCG. 
Table 7. Regression Result for HCG 
Equation 3 contains of three main independents 
variable, which are Debt, dummy group and no- 
group, and the interaction. The dependent variable 
is financial performance (ROE). 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant -2.630 -2.777 *** 
β31 DEBT 4.935 2.384 ** 
β32 IIO 0.222 0.456  
β33 FS 0.093 2.612 *** 
β34 CA 0.022 1.820 * 
β35 G -0.098 -0.387  
β36 DG -0.651 -0.894   
 R-squared 0.040  
 
 Table 8 shows Wald test on HCG when there is group and no-group 
condition amongst DCE firms. The effect of debt to performance is positive as 
predicted. However, the magnitude is lower on group-affiliate firm rather than no 
group-affiliate. The result also shows that constraint to expropriation more 
effective on no group-affiliate firm than group-affiliate firms. 
This research argues that firm with no group-affiliate will have 
independency to manage and control their firms. As independency increase, firm 
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with DCE will be able to use efficient financial resources, especially from debt 
policy. Group-affiliate firms will have higher chance to expropriate by other firm 
in the same group, although they have debt to constraint such expropriation. 
Table 8. Wald test of HCG 
Wald is a test for coefficient of 
regression based on several constraints.  
Test Statistic Value 
0 < β31 4.935  
t-statistic 2.384 ** 
0 < β31+ β36 4.284  
F-statistic 5.343 **   
β31+ β36 < β31 -0.651  
F-statistic 0.799    
 
 Table 9 and Table 10 show regression result and Wald test of HFG. The 
regression result shows that debt policy on facilitated expropriation firms will 
have negative effect on firm performance. This preliminary result diverges with 
OLS regression result on Table 6. However, this result concord with the 
hypothesis HF and the first step of Wald test on hypothesis HFG. The Wald test on 
hypothesis HFG comes with three steps (the same as HCG). 
Table 9. Regression Result for HFG 
Equation 4 contains of three main independents 
variable, which are Debt, dummy group and no- 
group, and the interaction. The dependent variable 
is financial performance (ROE). 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 0.1861 3.1081 *** 
β41 DEBT -0.0186 -6.4003 *** 
β42 IIO -0.0188 -1.0190  
β43 FS -0.0004 -0.1856  
β44 CA 0.0002 2.4309 ** 
β45 G -0.0234 -1.6328  
β46 DG 0.0205 7.1809 *** 
 R-squared 0.0217  
 
 Table 10 shows three steps of Wald test on HFG. The result shows that all 
three steps confirms with Wald, ranging from 5% to 10% significant level. Debt 
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of firms that facilitated expropriation and group-affiliate will have negative effect 
on performance. Higher debt to expropriate will lower firm financial performance.  
 The result also shows that the effect (magnitude of coefficient) of debt to 
performance is higher on no group-affiliate firms than group-affiliate firms are. 
The result diverges from HFG, which argues that the negative magnitude of debt to 
performance is higher for group-affiliate than no group-affiliate. This research 
argues suggest that deviation from hypothesis HFG result from risk reduction 
mechanism of diversification. 
Table 10. Wald test of HFG 
Wald is a test for coefficient of 
regression based on several constraints.  
Test Statistic Value 
β41 < 0 -0.0186  
t-statistic -6.4003 *** 
β41+β46 < 0 0.0019  
F-statistic 4.665 ** 
β41+β46 < β41 0.0205  
F-statistic 51.565 *** 
 
 Risk reduction mechanism of diversification resulted from firm with 
group-affiliate that can reduce their overall risk with diversify business risk 
amongst within groups. However, the suggestion needs further examination 
trough in-depth future research. 
4.3. Discussion and Suggestion 
 Research on debt-constraint or facilitated expropriation is the first in-depth 
research for Indonesian firms, especially firms that listed on Jakarta Stock 
Exchange. This research proposes the term of debt-constraint expropriation (DCE) 
and debt-facilitated expropriation (DFE); and verifies and tests issue on 
expropriation of debt policy. The result shows sufficient evident that constraint 
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and facilitated expropriation on debt is meaningful with regard to financial 
performance. Firms on debt-constraint expropriation condition, then debt policy 
will have positive effect on financial performance. On the contrary, debt-
facilitated expropriation condition, then debt policy will have negative effect on 
financial performance. Expropriation on debt is damaging overall firm value, 
however will increase personal wealth of agent and principal of the firm. 
 Further analysis tested the differences of debt-constraint expropriation and 
debt-facilitate expropriation on no group-affiliate and group-affiliate firms. Group 
and no group-affiliate represent the power of principal to elaborate the scheme of 
expropriation and sufficiently harm debtholders value. On debt-constraint 
expropriation, no group-affiliate firms will have higher positive effect of debt to 
performance than group-affiliate firms are. This research shows that no group-
affiliate firms have independency to manage and control their firms. As 
independency increase, firm with debt-constraint expropriation will be able to use 
efficient financial resources, especially from debt policy. Group-affiliate firms 
will have higher chance to expropriate by other firm in the same group, although 
they have debt to constraint such expropriation. 
 On debt-facilitate expropriation, this research shows contradict result. 
Firms with group-affiliate will have more chance to engage in risk reducing 
mechanism trough diversification than firm with no group-affiliate. Risk reduction 
mechanism of diversification resulted from firm with group-affiliate that can 
reduce their overall risk with diversify business risk amongst within groups. 
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 Debt as bonding and monitoring on corporate governance practices, shows 
reliable system to reduce expropriation on minority shareholders and even 
debtholders value. Ownership affiliation also plays a major rule on expropriation 
of minority shareholders and debtholders. However, group-affiliate ownership has 
an advantage to diversify their risk of expropriation. This research suggests that 
no group-affiliate could engage in strategic partner or trade organization to cover 
their risk of expropriation.  
 30 
REFERENCES 
Backman, Michael, 1999, Asian Eclipse: Exposing the Dark Side of Business in 
Asia, Wiley: Singapore. 
Bebchuk, Lucian, Reinier Kraakman, and George Triantis, 1998, “Stock Pyramids, 
Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency 
Costs of Separating Control From Cash Flow Rights.” Working paper, 
Harvard Law School. 
Berger, Alan, and Gregory Udell, 1994, “Relationship Lending and Lines of 
Credit in Small Firm Finance,” Journal of Business, 68: 351-381. 
Bradley, Michael, Gregg Jarrell and E. Han Kim, 1984, “On the Existence of an 
Optimal Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Finance, 39: 
857-878. 
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H. P. Lang, 2000, “The Separation 
of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, forthcoming. 
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan, and Larry H. P. Lang, 1999a, 
“Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East Asian 
Corporations,” World Bank, Working Paper. 
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan, and Larry H. P. Lang, 1999b, 
“The Costs of Groups: Evidence from East Asia,” World Bank, Working 
Paper. 
Easterbrook, Frank, H., 1984, “Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends,” 
American Economic Review, 74: 650-659. 
Faccio, Mara and Larry H. P. Lang, 2000, “Separation of Ownership from Control: 
An Analysis of Ultimate Ownership in Western Europe,” The Chinese 
University of Hong Kong. 
Faccio, Mara, Larry H. P. Lang and Leslie Young, 2001, “Dividends and 
Expropriation,” American Economic Review, forthcoming. 
Fama, Eugene, and Kenneth French, 1992, “The Cross-Section of Expected 
Returns,” Journal of Finance, 46: 427-466. 
Fama, Eugene, and Michael Jensen, 1983a, “The Separation of Ownership from 
Control,” Journal of Law and Economics, 26: 301-325. 
Fama, Eugene, and Michael Jensen, 1983b, “Agency Problems and Residual 
Claims,” Journal of Law and Economics, 26: 327-349. 
Franks, Julian, and Walter Torous, 1993, “A Comparison of the U.K. and U.S. 
Bankruptcy codes,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 6: 95-103. 
Graham, John R., 1996, “Debt and the Marginal Tax Rate,” Journal of Financial 
Economics, 41: 41-73. 
 31 
Harris, Milton, and Artur Raviv, 1988, “Corporate Control Contests and Capital 
Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 321-349. 
Harris, Milton, and Artur Raviv, 1990, “Capital Structure and the Informational 
Role of Debt,”Journal of Finance, 45: 321-349. 
Hong Kong Society of Accountants (2000) A White Paper on the Proposed 
Changes to the Disciplinary Committee Proceedings Rules and Other 
Regulatory Matters. 
Hoshi, Takeo, David Scharfstein, and Anil Hashyap, 1991, “The Role of Banks in 
Reducing the Cost of Financial Distress in Japan”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 27: 125-160. 
Ismiyanti, F. and Hanafi, M.M., 2004, Struktur Kepemilikan, Risiko, dan 
Kebijakan Keuangan: Analisis Persamaan Simultan, Jurnal Ekonomi dan 
Bisnis Indonesia, Economics Faculty, Gadjah Mada University. 
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial 
Economics (Vol. 3), pp. 305-360. 
Jensen, Michael C., 1986, “Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, 
and Takeovers,” American Economic Review, 76: 323-329. 
Jensen, Michael C., 1989, “Eclipse Of The Public Corporation,” Harvard 
Business Review, 67: 61-75. 
Jensen, Michael C., and William Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, 3: 305-360. 
Johnson, Simon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei 
Shleifer, 2000, “Tunnelling,” American Economic Review Papers and 
Proceedings, 90: 22-27. 
Kester, Carl, 1986, “Capital and Ownership Structure: A Comparison of United 
States and Japanese Manufacturing Corporations,” Financial 
Management, 15: 5-16. 
Khanna, Tarun, and Krishna Palepu, 2000, “Is Group Affiliation Profitable in 
Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups,” 
Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
Kim, Wi Saeng, and Eric H. Sorensen, 1986, “Evidence on the Impact of Agency 
Costs of Debt in Corporate Debt Policy,” Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 21: 131-144. 
King, Mervin, and Donald Fullerton, 1984, “The Taxation Of Income From 
Capital,” University Press, Chicago, IL. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, dan R.W. Vishny, 2000, Agency 
Problems and Dividend Policies around the World, Journal of Finance 
55/1, 1-31. 
 32 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1999, 
“Corporate Ownership around the World,” Journal of Finance, 54: 471-
518. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. 
Vishny, 1997, “Legal Determinants of External Finance,” Journal of 
Finance, 52: 1131-1150. 
Mahadwartha, P.A. and Jogiyanto, H.M., 2002, Uji Teori Keagenan dalam 
Hubungan Interdependensi antara Kebijakan Hutang dengan Kebijakan 
Dividen, National Accounting Symposium, 5-6 September, Diponegoro 
University, Semarang. 
Mahadwartha, P.A., 2004, Pengawasan dan Pengikatan berbasis Kepemilikan 
Institusional Internal, Gadjah Mada University, dissertation, unpublished.  
Modigliani, F., and M. H. Miller, 1958, The cost of Capital, Corporate Finance, 
and the Theory of Investment, American Economic Review, 48, June, 261-
297. 
Modigliani, F., and M. Miller, 1963, Corporate Income Tax and the Cost of 
Capital: A Correction, American Economic Review, 53, June, 433-443. 
